Summaries of significant judgments released by the Court of Appeal (CA) in 2005 are set out below.

Chia Kok Leong and another v Prosperland Pte Ltd [2005] 2 SLR 484

This case adopted The Albazero exception for the first time in Singapore, and endorsed the “broad ground” enunciated in St Martins Property Corporation Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85.

The Albazero exception and the “broad ground” are exceptions to the general rule that a plaintiff is entitled to claim damages only for the actual loss suffered on account of a breach of contract. The Albazero exception, so named after the case of The Albazero [1977] AC 774, postulates that where it is in the contemplation of the parties that the proprietary interests in goods may be transferred from one owner to another after the contract has been entered into and before the breach which causes damage to the goods, an original party to the contract, if such be the intention of them both, is to be treated in law as having entered into the contract for the benefit of all persons who may acquire an interest in the goods before they are damaged, and is entitled to recover, by way of damages for breach of contract, the actual loss sustained by these persons.

The “broad ground” allows a litigant to recover substantial damages for the loss of his performance interest in not receiving the bargain for which he had contracted. The measure of damages is the cost of securing the performance of that bargain.

Ong Cheng Aik v Dayco Products Singapore Pte Ltd (in liquidation) [2005] 2 SLR 561

This case involved an application for an extension of time to file the Record of Appeal relating to a pending appeal. The application in this case was made before the expiry of the prescribed time to file the Record of Appeal. In granting the application, the CA drew a distinction between an application for an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal out of time, and that for an extension of time to file or serve the Record of Appeal out of time. In the former situation, there was no appeal; however, in the latter there was already an appeal, but the appellant had failed to take a required step in time. Thus the justification required for an application for extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal out of time had to be weightier or more compelling than that required for other applications for extension of time.

Chai Choon Yong v Central Provident Fund Board and Others [2005] 2 SLR 594

The appellant applied to the High Court for a declaration that her deceased daughter’s Central Provident Fund (CPF) nomination was null and void for breach of rule 4 of the CPF (Nomination) Rules (Cap 36, R 1, 1998 Rev Ed) (the Rules) concerning attestation of CPF nominations. She also submitted that there was no subsisting nomination and that the CPF moneys should therefore be paid to the Public Trustee for disposal “in accordance with any written law for the time being in force” pursuant to section 25(2) of the CPF Act (Cap 36, 2001 Rev Ed). The issues before the court were: (a) whether the phrase “written law” referred to intestacy law or to the will of the deceased; and (b) whether non-compliance with the Rules resulted in an invalid nomination. The High Court dismissed the application, holding that the phrase “written law”, according to the decision in Saniah Bte Ali v Abdullah bin Ali [1990] SLR 584, referred to intestacy law. The Court further held that there was no breach of the Rules and that a breach could, in any event, be waived.

In dismissing the appellant’s appeal, the CA held that a purposive reading of section 25 of the CPF Act favoured the use of intestacy law as “written law”. However, the Court observed that there were difficulties in this approach as no “written law” could strictly apply if CPF moneys were deemed to be separate from a deceased’s estate. The Court therefore suggested that Parliament consider amending section 25(2) of the CPF Act by adding the words “governing intestacy” after the phrase “any written law for the time being in force”. The CA also affirmed the High Court’s holding that rule 4 was not breached. It further stated that a breach of rule 4 would not invalidate the nomination on the particular facts of this case. The underlying purpose to prevent fraud had no relevance in these circumstances as the CPF Board had written and spoken to the deceased to confirm her choice of nominee.

Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 2297 v Seasons Park Ltd [2005]
2 SLR 613

The appellant management corporation brought an action in contract and tort against the developer of a condominium in respect of defects and damage to the common property. The most pertinent issue before the CA was whether the respondent was entitled to rely on the defence of “independent contractor”.

The appellant argued that pursuant to the Housing Developers (Control and Licensing) Act (Cap 130, 1985 Rev Ed) (“the HD Act”) and the rules made thereunder (the Rules), the respondent had a non-delegable duty to build the condominium in a good and workmanlike manner. The CA disagreed. In the CA’s view, there were no specific provisions in the HD Act or the Rules to support the appellant’s argument. The HD Act was intended to control and license the business of housing developers, and had nothing to do with building standards. In fact, the statute that dealt with building standards was the Building Control Act (Cap 29, 1999 Rev Ed) (the BC Act). The CA found that the BC Act recognised that the design and erection of a building in a development could be undertaken by competent professionals and contractors appointed by the developer.

Chin Bay Ching v Merchant Ventures Pte Ltd [2005] 3 SLR 142

The respondent commenced an action against the appellant for defamation and malicious falsehood, and obtained a mandatory injunction requiring the appellant to retract the allegedly defamatory letters, as well as a prohibitory injunction restraining the appellant from making further defamatory statements. The appellant appealed against the grant of both interlocutory injunctions.

The CA held that in an application for an interlocutory mandatory or prohibitory injunction in a defamation action, the jurisdiction of the Court had to be exercised with great caution, and could not be exercised simply on the usual guidelines set forth in American Cyanamid v Ethicon [1975] AC 396. Interlocutory injunctions should generally only be granted where it was clear that the statement complained of was libellous and no defence could possibly apply. In the case of an interlocutory mandatory injunction, the Court should also be satisfied that special circumstances existed to warrant such exceptional relief. In allowing the appeal, the CA found that the circumstances in the present case did not warrant the grant of either injunction.

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